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ABSTRACT. Recent studies have examined the use of currency and stamps for
nation-building in various contexts, with these artefacts seen as vehicles for indoc-
trination and gaining legitimacy by ruling elites – as part of ‘banal nationalism’. This
article goes further to argue that in moments of geopolitical upheaval, these symbolic
artefacts can play a crucial role in shaping the very framework of nationhood. This
article focuses on the Middle East during World War I and its aftermath, and on
British efforts to shape public opinion through the issuing of Palestine postage stamps
and currency (1920–7), which were intended to convey Britain’s commitment to
Zionism. Parallels are drawn to the introduction of Arab stamps and ﬂags during
the Arab Revolt (1916–18). The beneﬁt to Zionist nation-building and ‘Hebrew
Revival’ is discussed, as well as the strikingly different reactions of local constituencies
– Arabs and Jews – to the political message of these symbolic objects.
Introduction
Recent studies have examined the use of currency and stamps for nation-
building in various contexts, with these artefacts understood as vehicles for
indoctrination and gaining legitimacy by ruling elites. Seen as part of ‘banal
nationalism’, banknotes, coins, postage stamps and other artefacts reinforce
nationalist ideologies through everyday experiences. This article looks at the
British use of symbolic artefacts in the Middle East, and speciﬁcally in
Palestine, during World War I and its aftermath. It argues that during the
upheaval caused by the collapse of the Ottoman empire and by British
occupation, symbolic objects played a constitutive role in nation-building:
they were employed not to shape the ‘content’ of national identity within
already existing nation-states, but rather to produce the very framework of
nationhood. In the ﬂux of the late 1910s and the early 1920s, when the names,
characters and borders of the Middle East’s political units were still taking
shape, the introduction and circulation of state symbols proved an efﬁcient
way to promote British plans for the region. The Palestine currency – the
prime example discussed in this article – was proposed by the high-commis-
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sioner-to-be, Herbert Samuel, in 1920, before the ofﬁcial establishment of
Palestine as a separate territory. Like the Palestine stamps issued shortly
afterwards, and the stamps and ﬂag designed by the British for the Arab
Revolt (1916–18), the Palestine currency was thought of primarily as a
propagandist instrument, aimed at preparing local and international public
opinion to accept the region’s new geopolitical order. The symbolic-political
motivation behind the Palestine currency distinguished it from the other
colonial currencies in the British empire, which were issued for administrative
and monetary reasons. When the currency was ﬁnally introduced, in 1927,
Arabs and Jews understood it as a political statement to which they responded
in strikingly different ways.
Currencies and nation-building: sociological and historical perspectives
The last two decades have seen the emergence of a lively discussion among
historians and sociologists on the cultural role and meaning of currencies, and
especially on the relation between currencies and collective identities. Michael
Billig’s work on ‘banal nationalism’ called attention to the impact of everyday
practices and material objects on the reproduction of national identities (Billig
1995). Nationalist discourse is woven into daily experience through the
language and symbols that appear in the seemingly unremarkable fabric of
everyday life. National currencies are arguably the prime example of banal
objects used to reinforce nationhood. In his seminal work on the development
of national currencies (or, as they are sometimes known, territorial curren-
cies), Eric Helleiner has shown that these currencies are a relatively recent
phenomenon – the product of the rise of nation-states and industrial
capitalism (Gilbert and Helleiner 1999; Helleiner 2003). Before theQ1 twentieth
century, monetary systems in much of the world were far more heterogenic,
and foreign currencies circulated freely well beyond their countries of origin.
Only in the inter-war period did national currencies prevail and become the
norm.
Helleiner suggested several ways in which nation-building and national
currencies were interlinked (Helleiner 2003: 100–20). Firstly, the imagery and
names of money units were chosen carefully in order to instil national
sentiment in the minds of the population. By depicting certain personalities,
landmarks or events, the currency played an educational role; it taught the
masses the history of the nation and its values, in accordance with the
dominant ideology. Secondly, the currencies were important to promote the
notion of national sovereignty. National money reﬂected the independence of
the nation-state as a distinct unit in the global world order. The currency was
also thought of as a common denominator, or a medium of communication,
between different groups within the nation. As an artefact used by people in
towns and countryside, and by rich and poor, the currency bracketed regional
and class differences within a single imagined nation. Lastly, the currency
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reﬂected the level of popular trust in the nationalist project. Twentieth-
century national currencies were predominantly forms of paper money, whose
value was ﬁduciary – that is, dependent on popular trust and acceptance.
Trust in the currency upheld trust in the nation-state, and vice versa.
Economic prosperity and state legitimacy became interdependent.
Following Helleiner, a number of scholars examined the cultural signiﬁ-
cance of currencies’ visual aspect. Jacques Hyman, who studied the history of
‘banknote iconography’ in Europe as well as in Japan, has argued that the
visual language used on banknotes was indicative of the ‘content’ of collective
identities (Hymans 2004 and 2005). Tracing the developments in design of
European banknotes throughout the twentieth century, Hymans challenged
Helleiner’s emphasis on the ‘educational’ role of banknotes. According to
Hymans, the state used banknotes not so much to indoctrinate the population
as to gain legitimacy and approval. Changes in ‘banknote iconography’
represented attempts by the state to embrace shifts in popular ideology and
values.
The Palestine currency discussed in this article belonged to the class of
colonial currencies issued by imperial powers in Africa and Asia. As shown by
Helleiner (2002), these currencies were signiﬁcantly different from the cur-
rencies of sovereign nation-states. They were not independent currencies with
value of their own, but rather tokens of the ruling empire’s currency. For
example, British colonial currencies’ value was based on securities kept in the
metropolitan in pounds sterling. Helleiner has argued that colonial currencies
were introduced primarily for economic reasons: to create monetary unions
between colonies and metropolitans, and to reduce transaction fees, thus
facilitating trade within the empire. In addition, colonial currencies allowed
colonial authorities to gain an important source of revenue through seigno-
rage – the proﬁt derived by the currency issuer through exchange fees and
interest on securities. Helleiner has stated that in the British empire, the
symbolic dimension played a minor role, if any at all, in the decision to issue
colonial currencies. Nevertheless, some colonial ofﬁcials believed that Eur-
opean-styled currencies could act as a civilising factor, teaching native
populations the values of frugality, punctuality and self-discipline. As time
passed, growing attention was paid by British ofﬁcials to the imagery on
colonial banknotes as vehicles to express colonial ideology. This point was
illustrated effectively in Wambui Mwangi’s study of banknote imagery in
British-ruled East Africa between 1921 and the 1960s (Mwangi 2002). The
designs of the 1920s East African banknotes designs were aimed at reafﬁrming
and communicating British notions about Africa, rather than seeking legiti-
macy within the colonised population. The banknotes presented Africa as an
empty continent of wide open spaces and wildlife; no native Africans
appeared on the notes. These images corresponded to the European imagining
of Kenya as an Edenic wild safari, open for European adventurers.
As I shall I argue in the following section, the British-Mandate Palestine
currency differed from the colonial currencies discussed by Helleiner: the
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symbolic-political dimension was the main reason for its introduction.
Exploring the British use of the currency and other state symbols in Palestine
and the Middle East sheds new light on the constitutive nation-building role
these artefacts can play in moments of geopolitical upheaval.
Herbert Samuel and the Palestine currency
The man behind the establishment of the PalestineQ2 pound was Herbert
Samuel, a leading British Liberal politician and Palestine’s ﬁrst British high
commissioner (Wasserstein 1992). In 1920, shortly before he took ofﬁce,
Samuel recommended the establishment of a Palestine currency as one of the
priorities of British rule.1
From an economic point of view, Palestine was a far from lucrative prize. It
was an impoverished, small country with no real natural resources; its
population of around 600,000 was recovering from the ravages of World
War I. Indeed, in his report on the economic conditions of the country,
Samuel concluded that Palestine had ‘under-developed resources [. . .] hardly
any manufacturing industries. Communications are bad. There is no harbour
. . . ownership of land is often uncertain.’2 Therefore, the economic beneﬁts of
a new currency were unclear. More importantly, at the time of Samuel’s
suggestion, Palestine’s ﬁnal political status had not yet been concluded in
international negotiations, and its borders were not yet agreed. Why, then,
was there an urgent need for a special new currency for this territory?
The importance attached by Samuel to the currency issue has been
overlooked by most historians of British-ruled Palestine. The two main
numismatic studies of the currency do not provide an adequate explanation
for its establishment (Berlin 2001; Dabbah 2005). In the most authoritative
study of the Palestine currency notes, Raphael Dabbah suggested that
seigniorage revenues were the primary motivation for the establishment of
the currency (Dabbah 2005: 21–2). Yet as Dabbah himself notes with some
puzzlement, the seigniorage consideration was not mentioned even once in the
lengthy discussions prior to the actual introduction of the currency in 1927.
Barbara Smith, in her study of British economic policy in 1920s Palestine,
observed rightly that the motivation behind the currency was political. In her
interpretation, the currency was ‘a pledge of future independence to the
population’, implying that the currency was an overture to the Arabs of
Palestine (Smith 1993: 27). As I shall argue, the real reason was quite the
opposite: the currency was meant to deal a blow to Arab national aspirations,
rather than to encourage them. To understand Samuel’s reasoning and
motivation, we should ﬁrst examine the political situation in Palestine and
the Middle East following World War I.
Palestine was occupied by British forces in 1917 and 1918 as part of the
campaign against the Ottoman empire. Allied plans for the region were
outlined in the 1916 Sykes – Picot Agreement, prescribing the dismemberment
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of the Ottoman empire and its division into British and French spheres of
inﬂuence, and an Arab kingdom in the Hijaz. Palestine, or most of it, was
designated to be ruled by an undeﬁned internationalQ3 regime (Fromkin 1990).
However, in 1917, Britain shifted its policy towards the territory by
embracing the Zionist cause. In November 1917, as British forces were
making their way towards Jerusalem, the British government published the
Balfour Declaration, which pledged support for the establishment of a
National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine, provided that ‘nothing
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing
non-Jewish communities in Palestine’. While it was not stated explicitly, the
declaration implied that the Jewish National Home would be established
under British supervision, thus presenting a case for direct British rule over
the Holy Land.
Yet in the subsequent years, it was not entirely clear if and how the Balfour
Declaration would be implemented. In the aftermath of World War I, the
political future of the Middle East still seemed in ﬂux: borders, states and
kingdoms were still being contemplated and negotiated. The British military
administration in Jerusalem did not acknowledge the Balfour Declaration
until February 1920, and refrained from translating it into actual policies as
long as the country’s political status and its borders were not formally
concluded. Many of the military administrators were suspicious or even
hostile to the idea of the Jewish National Home, and they warned London of
the dangers of pursuing this policy (Shepherd 1999; Wasserstein 1992: 38–41).
At the same time, Arab political opposition to Zionism became increas-
ingly vocal in demonstrations held in Jerusalem, Jaffa and other cities.
Testifying before an American fact-ﬁnding mission dispatched by President
Wilson, Arab leaders expressed their rejection of the proposed British
Mandate and its terms (Segev 2000). The Arab political elite aligned itself
with Arab nationalists in Damascus, where a semi-independent Arab admin-
istration was set up by the Emir Faysal, one of the chief commanders of the
Arab Revolt. Arab Palestinian nationalists had joined Faysal’s forces in the
hope that an Arab national liberation would encompass Palestine. Conse-
quently they started referring to Palestine as ‘Southern Syria’, and a weekly
Arab nationalist newspaper was established in Jerusalem with that name.
Indeed, a political union between Syria and Palestine was not unthinkable:
before the war, Palestine was widely considered to be a part of greater Syria in
cultural and economic terms; Palestine’s northern districts were ruled from
Damascus. Arab political efforts culminated in the Syrian Congress in
Damascus in March 1920, when the Emir Faysal was crowned by Arab
delegates as the king of Syria and Palestine (Khalidi 1997).
Herbert Samuel’s reconnaissance visit to Palestine in March 1920, three
months before his ofﬁcial appointment as high commissioner, was ostensibly
intended to survey the country’s economic and ﬁnancial conditions. But the
visit’s real aim was to examine the political situation and the emerging
opposition to Britain’s commitment to Zionism. Samuel was not only a
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
r The authors 2010. Journal compilation r ASEN/Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2010
Creating a country through currency and stamps 5
(B
W
UK
 N
AN
A 
47
0 W
eb
pd
f:=
08
/27
/20
10
 09
:14
:57
 39
04
31
 B
yte
s 1
9 P
AG
ES
 n 
op
era
tor
=)
 8/
27
/20
10
 9:
14
:59
 A
M
leading British politician and the former home secretary under Asquith
(1916); he was also a British Jew and a dedicated Zionist, who had played a
key role in preparing the ground for the Balfour Declaration. This, indeed,
was the reason he was nominated as high commissioner by Prime Minister
Lloyd-George, an enthusiastic supporter of Zionism. Yet in his stay in
Jerusalem in March 1920, Samuel was taken aback by the zeal of Arab
nationalism: ‘Arab Nationalist and Anti-Zionist feeling is a very real thing’,
he wrote to his son. He even considered declining the post when it was offered,
as he feared that the appointment of a Jew as high commissioner would
provoke great antagonism and jeopardise the Zionist project (Wasserstein
1992: 243).
In a conﬁdential report to the foreign secretary, Earl Curzon, Samuel tried
to play down concerns about Arab opposition, but nevertheless admitted the
existence of ‘national patriotic sentiment among the small class of politically
conscious Arabs’.3 Samuel was perturbed not so much by Arab protests as by
the willingness of British ofﬁcials to pay attention to them. Challenges to the
National Home policy were made not only in the streets of Jaffa and
Jerusalem, but also at the British military headquarters in Jerusalem. The
ofﬁcers in Jerusalem, wrote Samuel to London, ‘have regarded rather more
seriously than they deserved the anti-Zionist manifestations which had taken
place’. They had even gone as far as to recommend recognising Faysal as King
of Palestine – or else, they had warned, Palestine could face the immediate
prospect of unrest.
Samuel understood well that the inclusion of Palestine in a Syrian King-
dom would spell the end of the Zionist project, and he moved quickly to
counter these suggestions. It was possible to overcome Arab opposition, he
argued, by communicating a clear message to the local Arab population: it
should be explained to them that the future of Palestine was, in his words, a
‘chose juge´e’, and continued agitation would be without result (Wasserstein
1992: 241). As implied by the Balfour Declaration, Palestine was to be ruled
by the British as a separate polity, designated for Jewish settlement as a Jewish
National Home, and nothing the Arabs would do could change this. The
likely audience for this message encompassed not only Palestine’s Arab
population but also Britain’s international allies and British ofﬁcers in both
Jerusalem and London. All had to be told in no unclear terms that the British
plans were irreversible.
Samuel’s proposal for a Palestine currency should be understood against
this background, as a medium to express the British political message.
Samuel’s own words leave no doubt that the motivation for the currency
was political:
In determining the form of the future currency of Palestine, political considerations
must be a deciding factor. It is assumed in this memorandum that the settlement of the
status of Palestine will constitute it as a country with characteristics of its own,
developing on independent lines. A distinct currency is one of the principal marks of a
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distinct State. It is necessary, therefore, that Palestine should have a currency of its
own.4
Samuel had developed the idea of a Palestine currency prior to his visit, in
consultation with the Zionist bank Anglo-Palestine Company and in discus-
sions with James de Rothschild and the economist John Maynard Keynes
(Wasserstein 1992).5 Yet his visit to Palestine added a sense of urgency to this
plan. His currency memorandum proposed to establish a ‘distinctively
Palestinian’ paper currency, backed by either the Egyptian pound or the
British sterling. While he did not provide a schedule, it seems that he believed
the currency could be issued almost instantly – as indicated by his reference to
an ad-hoc currency issued by British forces ﬁghting in the Russian civil war in
1918 as a model for the Palestine currency.
The quicker the existence of Palestine imprinted itself on public imagina-
tion, the less chance there was that the National Home policy would be
reversed. The issuing of a currency, as a widely circulating symbol of
sovereignty, was a relatively easy way to present British plans for Palestine
as a fait accompli. It was a perfect medium to convey the message: the notes,
which would circulate throughout the entire country, would state in unam-
biguous manner that Palestine was a separate polity under British rule,
divorced from Syria; and Britain’s unshakeable commitment to Zionism
would be demonstrated through the appearance of Hebrew as one of the
ofﬁcial languages on the notes and coins. Samuel mentioned this explicitly in
his memorandum: ‘If the Mandate embodies the principle of the Jewish
National Home, the Hebrew names of the coins should have reference to the
historical Jewish coinage; other names might perhaps be adopted in Arabic.’
Soon after submitting his memorandum, Samuel wrote to the Zionist leader
Chaim Weizmann, asking for suggestions for Hebrew names for the coins as
well as emblems to be adopted on the coins and stamps. Prudently, he added
that using emblems with a distinctively Jewish political signiﬁcance, such as
the Star of David, would be ‘premature’.6 No similar consultation with
representatives of the Arab majority is recorded.
Except for the political imperative, the memorandum gave no other reason
to establish the currency. In monetary terms, the beneﬁts of the proposal were
doubtful. In the preceding three years, the British military administration had
expended considerable effort in stabilising the currency situation in Palestine.
The system that the British found in Palestine in 1917 was complicated and
chaotic: it consisted of Ottoman and various European gold and silver coins,
as well as almost worthless Ottoman paper money; exchange rates ﬂuctuated
considerably between towns and even within a province (Rubinshtayn 1997).
The British set ofﬁcial exchange rates and introduced the Egyptian pound (in
notes and token coins) as a preferred means of payment, overcoming public
suspicion towards paper money. The population’s acceptance of the Egyptian
pound was a remarkable success, which no doubt contributed to economic
recovery. In such circumstances, introducing a new local paper currency could
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confuse the population, create mistrust and undermine British achievements.
Furthermore, British colonial administrators did not see the beneﬁts of a local
currency. Imports, government and army requirements and administrative
salaries were all handled in foreign exchange – preferably sterling – as were the
exports (Smith 1993: 28). Therefore, it is no surprise that ofﬁcials in the
Palestine Administration were far from enthusiastic about Samuel’s currency
plans (Dabbah 2005: 21).
State symbols as geopolitical tools in world war I
Herbert Samuel was not the ﬁrst British ofﬁcial in the Middle East to propose
the introduction of symbols of sovereignty in order to promote geopolitical
ends. His belief in the power of ‘banal’ artefacts to shape public perceptions
was in line with British efforts during World War I, as manifested during the
Arab Revolt. British involvement in the Revolt included not only the supply
of arms and funds, but also the creation of stamps and a ﬂag. It is useful to
look at these examples to understand the mind-set of British colonial ofﬁcials
of the time.
Sharif Hussein of Mecca declared his secession from the Ottoman empire in
June 1916, with British support and reassurances. Arab forces soon took hold
of Mecca and Jeddah, yet news of the revolt was denied or received with
scepticism by the international press. Ronald Storrs, oriental secretary at the
British Arab Bureau in Cairo at the time, suggested issuing Arab Revolt
postage stamps, ‘which would carry the Arab propaganda, self-paying and
incontrovertible, to the four corners of the earth’ (Ayalon 1995; Beech 2005;
Storrs 1943: 220). Storrs approached the Sharif for designs for the stamps,
and received a drawing featuring a mosque overlooking Mecca. But Storrs
found it completely unsatisfactory: it was ‘a design purporting to typify
Islamic architecture, but to the layman indistinguishable from the Eddystone
Lighthouse. I felt that this would never do’. Storrs’ account of what followed
reads like a textbook example of orientalism as it was analysed by Edward
Said: namely the creation of the modern Orient by its colonisers through the
intertwined working of scholarship and political domination (Said 1978).
Storrs decided to use his knowledge of Muslim culture in order to design
stamps that were truer to Arab tradition:
[Storrs] wandered with [T. E.] Lawrence round the Arab Museum in Cairo collecting
suitable motifs in order that the design in wording, spirit and ornament, might be as far
as possible representative and reminiscent of a purely Arab source of inspiration.
Pictures and views were avoided, for these never formed part of Arab decoration, and
are foreign to its art: so also was European lettering.
The stamps, as a propaganda device to serve imperial interests, had to appear
purely Arab; while Hussein’s design included European lettering, their
presence could detract from the authenticity of the stamps, and therefore
had to be omitted. Storrs presumed that British ofﬁcers could express the
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spirit of the Orient better than the Sharif of Mecca. This was T. E. Lawrence’s
ﬁrst involvement with the Revolt, which would make him the legendary
‘Lawrence of Arabia’. The stamps he designed bore the name of Mecca and
the Hijaz, yet the ornaments they displayed were drawn from Egyptian
contexts: the stamps showed inscriptions and carving from Cairo mosques
and other monuments (Ayalon 1995). Sharif Hussein was dismayed to learn of
the rejection of his design, but his protests were to no avail and Lawrence’s
Hijaz stamps were issued in October 1916. Ironically, one of the objectives of
the issuing of the stamps was to convince Muslims throughout the world that
the Revolt was meant to promote Arab, not British, control over the holy
cities of Mecca and Medina, and that Britain had no intention to rule the
Hijaz. Yet the stamps themselves were a manifestation of the very limited
nature of Arab independence and sovereignty.
It was not the last time the British intervened to create state symbols for
their Shariﬁan prote´ge´. The second intervention, with more lasting effects,
was the creation of the modern Arab ﬂag, with the involvement of Sir Mark
Sykes of the Foreign Ofﬁce, as noted by historian David Fromkin (1990).
Sykes was instrumental in shaping British policy in the Middle East during
World War I. He is best known for the aforementioned Sykes – Picot
Agreement that he concluded with the French government representative
Franc¸ois Georges-Picot, carving up the post-war Middle East between the
two colonial powers. He was also involved in the negotiations over the
Balfour Declaration. While some historians have contested Sykes’s role in
designing the Arab ﬂag (Qassimiyya 1970), archival evidence leaves little
doubt that Sykes was indeed deeply involved in its design. In February 1917,
Sykes wrote to the British high commissioner of Egypt, mentioning the ﬂag as
an urgent matter to resolve:
I am strongly of opinion that the Arab Committee in Cairo would be well advised to
devise and settle upon some ﬂag or ensign which could be ﬂown whenever the French
ﬂag is ﬂown in Areas A and B. [. . . The ﬂag] should suggest an Arab federation and
could be called the ﬂag of united Arabs. If no better device suggests I submit the
enclosed sketches. The colours are representative of the Arab dynasties, Abbasid black;
Omayad white; Alid green; and the Sherif and most of the trucial chiefs have red.7
Areas A and B, to which Skyes was referring, were the designated spheres of
French and British inﬂuence, respectively, according to the secret Sykes –
Picot memorandum. Alongside the ﬂag, Sykes recommended that the Allied
invasion force include Arab representatives, men of ‘sufﬁcient capacity to
carry weight with the Urban elements of Areas A and B’; to be ‘ostensibly’
elected by the Arab committees in Cairo. Therefore, Sykes’s letter posits the
question of the Arab ﬂag within the context of colonial plans for the Middle
East. The ﬂag was part of an attempt to portray the Allied invasion as an
Arab liberation war. Sykes’s suggestion that the ﬂag would be ﬂown wherever
the French ﬂag is ﬂown was not accidental: Arab nationalists had little
knowledge at that point of France’s ambition to take over large parts of the
region, and would no doubt have reacted with deep suspicion to the sight of
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87
the Tricolore ﬂying over Damascus. The sight of an Arab ﬂag could boost
their nationalist enthusiasm and allay their fears.
Sykes attached four sketches of possible designs to the aforementioned
letter. One of them, consisting of three horizontal strips and a red triangle,
gained the approval of Sharif Hussein, and so the ﬂag of the Arab national
movement was born. It was ﬁrst ﬂown in Mecca on the ﬁrst anniversary of the
revolt in June 1917 (Qassimiyya 1970). The ﬂag fulﬁlled Sykes’s expectations:
even before Faysal’s arrival in Damascus in September 1918, Arab ﬂags were
ﬂying all across Syria and Lebanon, and were received enthusiastically as
symbols of liberation (Gelvin 1998: 244–5). However, two years later, when
France became the Mandatory power in Syria and Lebanon, French forces
removed Faysal from power, banned the Arab ﬂag and ended the experiment
of the Arab Syrian Kingdom. The ﬂag was then adopted by the national Arab
Palestinian movement, and is still used today as the Palestinian ﬂag. A slightly
modiﬁed version of the same ﬂag, adorned with a crown, serves as the
Jordanian ﬂag to this day.
In his autobiographical account of the Arab Revolt, Seven Pillars of
Wisdom, T. E. Lawrence – the man who began his career designing the
Arab Revolt stamps and ended as ‘Lawrence of Arabia’, the kingmaker of the
modern Middle East – wrote candidly about the short-lived Arab independent
rule of Damascus (1918–20): ‘Our aim was a fac¸ade rather than a ﬁtted
Q4 building’ (Lawrence 1926: 673). That is, Emir Faysal’s administration of Syria
was meant primarily as a propaganda show, to herald the anticipated arrival
of Arab self-rule. It is no surprise that a great deal of attention was devoted by
British ofﬁcials to ‘fac¸ades’; that is, to symbols such as stamps and ﬂags
behind which, at this point, there was not much in real social, political or
diplomatic terms. In their use of the stamps and the ﬂag, the British displayed
an acute awareness of the power of symbols to shape popular perceptions and
to fuel national sentiment, and hence to shape the political reality. Moreover,
these symbols showed British willingness to adopt the language of nationalism
that emerged as the prevailing geopolitical discourse during World War I. The
language of imperial interests and exploits had to be discarded and disguised,
while new claims had to be made in the name of future national emancipation
and self-determination for the peoples of the Ottoman empire. By skilfully
harnessing this new language in their favour, while emptying it of real content,
the British succeeded in portraying a colonial exercise in divide-and-conquer
as a war of liberation.
Palestine by any other name
Let us now return to Palestine of the summer of 1920. It soon emerged that
Samuel’s plans for an ad-hoc introduction of a currency were unrealistic. The
currency could not be issued until Britain was ofﬁcially granted the Mandate
over the territory by the League of Nations; this approval was achieved only
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in 1922. Nevertheless, as he came to ofﬁce in June 1920, Samuel was
determined to ﬁnd the means to communicate the irreversibility of British
rule over Palestine and its commitment to the Jewish National Home. Like
Ronald Storrs before, he seized on postage stamps to carry the message. The
military administration had issued provisional stamps in Arabic and English,
marked with the name of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (E.E.F.). In July
1920, Samuel ordered a reprint of these provisional stamps on the grounds
that Hebrew, one of the three ofﬁcial languages, was missing. The existing
stamps were to be printed over with the name of the territory in English,
Arabic and Hebrew (Persoff 1973: 18).
But what was the name of the territory? The answer was far from obvious.
Samuel believed that there was no controversy over the English (Palestine)
and the Arabic (Filastin). But the Hebrew term, he wrote later to the Foreign
Ofﬁce, proved ‘a point of great delicacy’.8 The Hebrew translation of Samuel’s
ﬁrst proclamation used the term Erets Yisarael (Land of Israel), the most
common Hebrew name for the land since the ﬁrst century. But Samuel feared
that such an unambiguous term could have severe repercussions. In the few
months since his ﬁrst visit to Palestine, local opposition to Zionism had taken
a violent form. The Muslim Nabi-Musa pilgrimage of April 1920 turned to
anti-Jewish riots in Jerusalem, and Samuel was concerned that a controversial
choice of a Hebrew name could lead to more violence. However, the urgency
of issuing the stamps seemed so great to Samuel that he decided not to take
the time to consult on this matter with his superiors in Britain, or with the
local population. Rather, he devised an ad-hoc compromise. In a handwritten
note he instructed the postmaster general to use the Hebrew transliteration
Palestina followed by the acronyms of the Hebrew letters ‘Aleph Yod’ for
Erets Yisrael (Persoff 1973: 15; Storrs 1943: 383–4). As Sahar Huneidi has
shown, British Foreign Ofﬁce ofﬁcials were taken by surprise by Samuel’s
decision, although they authorised it in retrospect (Huneidi 2001: 122).
Palestina (E.Y.) became Palestine’s ofﬁcial Hebrew name, and it conse-
quently appeared on all ofﬁcial documents and notices.
Palestina was not Samuel’s invention: it was a phonetic transliteration of
the German and Russian term for Palestine, which had gained currency in
Hebrew writing in central and eastern Europe since the late nineteenth
century. But it did not carry the emotional and religious resonance of Erets
Yisrael. The term Palestina (E.Y.) was therefore resented by Zionists, who
saw the hybrid term as a game of ‘hide and seek’ (Frumkin 1954: 237–8).
Similarly, Arab nationalists were not deluded: Erets Yisrael, even in
acronyms, was a dangerous validation of Zionist claims and intentions. Jamal
al-Husayni, secretary of the Palestinian Arab Action Committee, petitioned to
the high court against the use of the Hebrew term on stamps. He argued that
Arabs were being forced to use ‘a document in which their country is
described as the Land of Israel’. Husayni demanded that the acronyms be
deleted, or that Arabs may be allowed to add their own acronyms – S.J., for
Suriya al-Janubiyya (Southern Syria) in conjunction with the name Filastin to
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express their wishes to become part of a uniﬁed Syria. The court did not
attempt to investigate the legitimacy of the Hebrew term, and instead
conducted an inquiry into the legal powers of the postmaster general. The
case was dismissed (Persoff 1973: 15).9
The fact that the ofﬁcial name of Palestine was decided in such a rushed
manner, to enable the issue of the stamps, demonstrates that the signiﬁcance
of these symbolic artefacts far exceeded their postage function. Rather, they
played an active role in the battle over local and international public opinion,
facilitating the creation of Palestine as a modern polity and consolidating the
perception of its existence.
Hebrew as state language
The British Mandate over Palestine received an international seal of approval
in 1922. The terms of the League of Nations Mandate endorsed the creation
of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, requiring Great Britain to facilitate
Jewish immigration and Zionist land acquisition, and to coordinate its
policies with a Jewish Agency representing the interests of the Jewish
community. The Mandate also stipulated that English, Arabic and Hebrew
shall be the ofﬁcial languages of Palestine, and that these had to appear on
stamps and money: ‘Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or
money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew, and any statement or
inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.’10
The trilingual format became the standard not only for coins and stamps,
but also for Mandatory ofﬁcial stationery, signs, ordinances, public notices
and more. Hebrew was ofﬁcially required only in districts where Jewish
inhabitants constituted at least a ﬁfth of the population (Suleiman 2004: 145).
As late as December 1946, after substantial Jewish immigration, only six out
of Palestine’s sixteen districts fulﬁlled this demographic criterion (McCarthy
1990). However, stamps and money circulated throughout the entire country,
bringing Hebrew to areas where hardly any Jews lived. Britain’s commitment
to Zionism was made visible in everyday experiences, in every payment made
for household needs and on each letter received or sent.
Questions of language are always central to the project of nation-building
(Anderson 1991), and this was especially true to Zionism. The ofﬁcial
recognition of Hebrew was not only an acknowledgement of Jewish national
aspirations; it was also a crucial contribution to ‘Hebrew Revival’, transform-
ing Hebrew from a holy writ into a spoken national language. Hebrew was a
natural choice for a Jewish national language: it was a written language
shared by Jews across the diaspora; a language of prayer, used increasingly in
the nineteenth century for secular writing such as newspapers, literature and
education. Yet in 1920, few Jews in Palestine or elsewhere could actually
speak it.
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The ‘revival’ of Hebrew was a formidable challenge, and undoubtedly one
of Zionism’s biggest achievements. Popular histories highlighted the role of
visionaries such as Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, the compiler of the ﬁrst modern
Hebrew dictionary, who was the ﬁrst to raise his children in Hebrew. More
critical studies have questioned Ben-Yehuda’s impact, and focused on other
grassroots cultural and educational developments. Benjamin Harshav (1993)
argued that the success of the revival was due to the establishment of a
Hebrew educational framework between 1906 and 1913 in Jaffa, Jerusalem
and Zionist colonies, creating a social base for the spoken language – the ﬁrst
generation of native speakers. However, Hebrew’s ofﬁcial endorsement by the
British Mandate is largely neglected in the popular and scholarly accounts. It
should be remembered that the social base of the spoken language, as deﬁned
by Harshav, constituted a small minority among Palestine’s Jews in 1920.
Many orthodox Jews opposed the sacrilegious use of Hebrew for mundane
purposes. Even the Zionist Commission, which arrived in Palestine in 1918 to
pursue the fulﬁlment of the Balfour Declaration, held its discussions in
English, German and Yiddish (Segev 2000: 99).
As a state language, Hebrew letters were displayed visibly on every ofﬁcial
building and street corner in Jerusalem. On money and stamps, the language
was to gain unprecedented currency. It is doubtful if the transformation of a
holy writ into a language of everyday life could have been as successful had it
not been awarded government recognition as a national language.
The Palestine pound
Herbert Samuel continued to promote the Palestine currency throughout his
ofﬁce as high commissioner, from 1920 to 1925. The process was much slower
than he originally envisaged, and included a lengthy consultation with banks
and businessmen in Palestine and with the British Treasury. Ofﬁcials in
London continued to doubt the beneﬁt of the currency, yet Samuel succeeded
in winning approval for the Currency Act, which he modelled after the Kenya
legislation (Dabbah 2005).
The political consideration most probably remained central to his efforts.
True, the existence of Palestine as a separate territorial unit was no longer
seriously opposed after the approval of the Mandate in 1922. Arab hopes for
unity within a Greater Syria faded rapidly as the divide between French-ruled
Syria and Lebanon and British-ruled Palestine and Transjordan became an
undisputable fact. Yet British commitment to the Zionist project remained as
contentious as it had been in 1920, and was questioned repeatedly in London.
In 1923, when a new government came to power, the Palestine policy came
under review. Samuel once again played an important role in defending the
Jewish National Home, and his intervention is credited for the fact that the
policy was left intact (Wasserstein 1992). It seems probable that Samuel
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believed that the currency was a means to bolster the Zionist project in the
face of these challenges.
The currency was ﬁnally issued in 1927, two years after Samuel’s departure.
As part of the ‘Sterling Bloc’, the value of the Palestine pound was tied to the
pound sterling and backed by sterling securities, and was managed by a
currency board in London. The currency bore trilingual lettering as well as
symbols and images that were chosen to represent Palestine. The coins
featured an olive branch; the notes presented ancient and revered monuments,
carefully chosen to appeal to all faiths. No images of people appeared on the
notes.
Faced with the new currency, local constituencies in Palestine interpreted it
as a political statement, very much as Herbert Samuel had intended. Both
Arabs and Jews saw the currency as part of British policies to implement the
Jewish National Home.11 Jewish and Arab newspapers alike pointed out that
the currency was introduced one day before the tenth anniversary of the
Balfour Declaration.12 While the Palestine Currency Board ofﬁcially claimed
that ‘the currency was well received by all sections of the community’, in
reality the reception of the currency was sharply divided along national lines
(Dabbah 2005).13
All Zionist newspapers, from the right-wing Do’ar Ha-yom to Labour’s
Davar expressed utmost jubilation and pronounced the issue of the currency a
historical turning point. Most Jewish commentators focused exclusively on
the symbolic implications of this development for the Zionist movement. The
currency was seen as reafﬁrming Jewish hopes for self-determination in
Palestine, and a precursor for a Jewish nation-state. One example of the
outburst of pathos can be found in Davar, ‘the newspaper of the workers of
Erets Yisrael’. One columnist wrote:
I am not very fond of money, perhaps because I don’t have any. I don’t have any
money, perhaps because I am not very fond of it. I would give my last penny to see the
evil money depart from this world. But today, more than any other day, I want money.
I want to stand in the queue to exchange Egyptian money with Erets Yisraelmoney. To
feel through a coin of my own, the tremor that passes through me, from head to toe,
with the ﬁrst touch of a coin with square letters, Hebrew letters [. . .]
And I know well: Palestina is written on the coin in full, and from Erets Yisrael all that
remains are acronyms, and I know the companions in English and Arabic. And I also
heard the petty-accounting: the Hebrew is at the bottom, at the top, and so on and so
forth, but all these would not overshadow my joy and would not belittle this fact:
internationally recognised legal tender was established in Erets Yisrael, and Hebrew
letters are inscribed on it! . . . Today, we have climbed one step on the ladder, and who
can tell where its top will reach.14
A more sober commentator inHa’aretz admitted that the Palestine pound was
a mere ‘shadow of a currency’, as its value was reliant completely on the
British pound; he lamented the absence of a Palestinian central bank. Indeed,
in Zionist economic circles the currency arrangements were deemed far from
satisfactory (Smith 1993). Yet monetary and economic considerations were
virtually forgotten in the nationalist jubilation.
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In contrast, the Arab press reacted with suspicion and hostility, because of
Arab objections to the British Mandate and its support of Zionism. Most
vehement was the Jerusalem-based al-Jami’a al-’Arabiyya, the organ of the
Supreme Muslim Council, the mainstream Palestinian political faction. The
newspaper suggested that the new currency was a conspiracy to destitute Arab
Palestinians, in order to pave the ground for the government to achieve its
political plans.15 The newspaper highlighted the complaints of Jaffa mer-
chants regarding losses caused by the transition to the new currency.16 Al-
Jami’a al-’Arabiyya also criticised the poor Arabic lettering on the coins and
banknotes, which they claimed indicated a lack of respect for the Arab
population and its language. The prominent place of Hebrew, on the other
hand, proved that the new currency was part and parcel of the Jewish
National Home policies.17
Coins are national symbols, wrote the Transjordanian newspaper al-
’Urdun: ‘How could the Arabs be expected to put in their pockets the symbols
of their enemies, who were trying to drive the [Arabs] out of their own
country?’18
Questioning the considerations behind the introduction of the currency, the
inﬂuential Jaffa-based Filastin commented: ‘None of us understands who
established it, to whose favour, who will issue it, what guarantees it, and
where is the gold to be kept against the paper notes that will pass through our
hands?’19 Interestingly, the Hebrew press never raised any doubts about the
ﬁnancial securities guaranteeing the currency. As paper money, the new
currency depended on public trust, but unlike Zionist Jews, Arab Palestinians
had little faith in the intentions of the British government. The Arab adoption
of the currency was out of need, not out of persuasion: ‘[The government]
makes for us whatever clothes it likes, and we have to wear them, whether it
suits us or not’, Filastin concluded bitterly.20 British policy in Palestine was a
diktat that the Arabs had to accept. It seems that Filastin understood perfectly
well Samuel’s original message: British plans in Palestine were a chose juge´e,
and nothing the Arabs could do or say would change that.
The only Arab newspaper to report favourably on the introduction of the
currency was Miraat al-Sharq, whose publisher had links with Zionist
intelligence and was perceived as a collaborator in the eyes of the Palestinian
mainstream (Cohen 2008: 117).21
A report on the popular reception of the new currency, sent to the Palestine
Currency Board in London shortly after the introduction of the Palestine
pound, reveals that the concerns voiced by the Arab press were widespread
among the Arab public. In virtually all of the Arab urban centres, from Acre
to Gaza, people expressed mistrust in the new currency regime and its
guarantees: they questioned whether the new currency would maintain its
value and its parity with British sterling.22 At the same time, the currency
ofﬁcer reported ‘keen reaction’ to the currency among the Jewish population.
Theoretically, the currency could have been read differently: it could have
been seen as a symbol of a future independent country of Arabs and Jews. The
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banknotes could have been presented as a common denominator between
different groups, bridging differences within one vision, accommodating both
Arab and Zionist aspirations. Yet almost no commentator saw it in this way,
and this is hardly surprising. Quite simply, it was impossible to reconcile the
contradictory aspirations of the two sides. While the Zionists looked forward
to a Jewish nation-state in Palestine, Arabs believed that Palestine, a country
with an overwhelming Arab majority at that point, should become an Arab
nation-state and that Zionist immigration and land purchases should be
stopped.
Indeed, it was never the intention of Herbert Samuel or other British
ofﬁcials to create a Palestinian national identity that could appeal to both
Arabs and Jews. The most they hoped for was to strike a balance between
their commitments to Zionism and to upholding the rights of the local Arab
population, in what was known as the ‘dual obligation’ (Smith 1993). The
balance between different constituencies was reﬂected in the banknotes’
iconography, which displayed carefully chosen ancient monuments that could
appeal to different religious groups. The vignettes on the banknotes featured
the Muslim holy site of the Dome of the Rock; Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem,
revered by Jews; a medieval tower in Ramallah; and the Citadel in Jerusalem’s
Old City. This choice highlighted the sacred past of the country as its deﬁning
feature: the past, it seems, was Palestine’s only future. Yet this sacred past was
viewed in strikingly different ways by Arabs and Jews. It could not serve as a
common heritage, but rather as the source of a bitter dispute. Furthermore,
the notes presented Palestine as a land empty of people: empty of its Arab
majority; empty of its growing Jewish minority. Thus they encouraged the
tendency of both sides to ignore the presence of the other while pursuing their
exclusivist nation-building projects, Zionist and Arab, leading to the inevi-
table clash between the two.
Conclusion
In his work on the sociology of money, Geoffrey Ingham argued that the
production of money is fundamentally a process of social conﬂict (Ingham
2004). Following Weber, Simmel and Keynes, Ingham interprets money as a
claim or a social obligation; the value of money is maintained by hegemonic
power – that is, by the state. Money, Ingham emphasises, is never a neutral
instrument. Rather, its very creation, circulation and function all rely on the
political order and on the struggle for power between different social
elements. Within this struggle, money should be understood as a stake or as
a weapon used to uphold power and inequality.
Ingham’s formulation of money as a weapon refers primarily to the
economic struggle between different classes. Yet this formulation is equally
pertinent and insightful for understanding the diverse roles money can play in
the process of nation-building, which inherently involves conﬂict. In the
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speciﬁc case of the British-Mandate Palestine currency, money was one of the
weapons employed in the battle over public opinion and the political future of
Palestine. As I have argued, the Palestine pound was proposed in 1920 by the
ﬁrst high commissioner to discourage Arab demands for national self-
determination as part of a Greater Syria ruled by the Emir Faysal. Instead,
the currency promoted the vision of Palestine as a separate territory, ruled by
the British, and designated as the site for a Jewish national home. These
claims were to be made through the display of the name of the country in
English, Arabic and, most importantly, Hebrew. The transformation of the
Jewish sacred writ into one of Palestine’s ofﬁcial languages acknowledged
Zionist national aspirations, and gave invaluable support to the revival of
Hebrew as a modern spoken language. From a written language used by a
small minority, Hebrew became a visible feature of everyday life, appearing in
every transaction made throughout the country. When the currency was
ﬁnally introduced in 1927, it was rightly interpreted by Arabs and Jews as a
statement of British commitment to the Balfour Declaration.
The history of the Palestine currency differs in a number of ways from
modern currencies in other contexts. Unlike other colonial currencies, which
were introduced primarily for economic and administrative reasons, for the
Palestine currency the symbolic dimension was paramount. The main motiva-
tion for the issue of the currency was its political effect as symbol of state
sovereignty. Furthermore, in Japan, Europe and other contexts, currency
designers sought to shape the ‘content’ of national identity in a given political
framework, within existing nation-states or colonial territories. In Palestine,
in contrast, the currency preceded the formal establishment of the polity, and
was conceived as an instrument to facilitate its very creation. Circulating
symbolic artefacts were designed to present the British vision for Palestine as a
deep-rooted reality, as illustrated by Herbert Samuel’s rush to issue stamps
before the name of the territory was formally decided. Similar methods had
been employed by the British during the Arab Revolt, when Arab stamps and
a ﬂag were introduced to present a British-sponsored uprising as a genuine
Arab war for liberation. British policy-makers believed in the power of banal
state symbols to give shape to the geopolitical reality: not only to legitimise an
already-existing regime, but also to create favourable conditions for the
establishment of such a regime. As popular symbols sank into popular
consciousness, they prepared the population to accept – enthusiastically or
reluctantly – a state of affairs that was still in the making. In their use of
stamps, currencies and ﬂags, the British revealed an acute understanding of
the power of symbols to shape popular perceptions, and thus to create
realities. To borrow the terms of T. E. Lawrence, symbolic fac¸ades had the
power to determine the future shape of geopolitical building.
These examples reveal the importance of state symbols for the process of
nation-building through their hold on public imagination. However, the
critical role described here would seem possible only in moments of great
geopolitical ﬂux. Such was the case in the Middle East in World War I and its
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aftermath, with the collapse of the centuries-old Ottoman empire and the
emergence of a novel political order amid a ﬁerce political struggle between
imperial powers and local movements.
Notes
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4 Herbert Samuel, currency memorandum.
5 The Anglo-Palestine Company was the ﬁrst to suggest a Palestine currency. In February 1918,
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proposing to issue banknotes in sterling values, with lettering in English, Arabic and Hebrew.
British military authorities rejected the idea on monetary grounds, and also because they believed
the currency would be interpreted as a political statement (Dabbah 2005: 58–61).
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(1995): 113–14.
9 See the court’s ruling in ‘H.C No.55/25 Jammal Eff. Husseini vs. The Government of
Palestine’ (Friedman 1937: 1483–6).
10 Mandate for Palestine, Article 22 (Berlin 2001).
11 Ha’Aretz, ‘al ha-Perek’, 1 November 1927.
12 Al-Jami’ah al-Arabiyyah, 20 October 1927; Davar, 1 November 1927.
13 Bank of England Archive, OV7/11, Report of the Palestine Currency Board for the Period
ended 31 March 1928, p. 4.
14 David, Z. ‘Le-Yom ha-Matbe’a’. Davar, 1 November 1927 (author’s translation).
15 Al-Jami’a al-Arabiyya, 18 November 1927.
16 Al-Jami’a al-Arabiyya, 24 November 1927.
17 Al-Jami’a al-Arabiyya, 24 November 1927.
18 Al-Urdun, quoted in Ha-Arets, 25 October 1927.
19 ‘Intidab Aw Isti’mar?’, Filastin, 18 October 1927 (author’s translation). See also Al-Jami’a al-
Arabiyya, 18 November 1927.
20 ‘Intidab Aw Isti’mar?’, Filastin, 18 October 1927.
21 Miraat al-Sharq, 17 and 24 November 1927.
22 PRO File F.152/2 Currency Ofﬁcer Davis to Palestine Currency Board, 23 December 1927
(no. 87).
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